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What are we talking about when we talk about the “securitization” of international migration 
in Mexico? A critique. 
 
Javier Treviño-Rangel1 
 
Undocumented international migration in Mexico is facing a serious human rights crisis. Each year, 
hundreds of thousands of migrants, above all from Central America, cross Mexico to reach the United 
States. Their journey risks extortion, kidnap, torture, disappearance, and death. For activists and 
civil society organizations, this crisis is explained by what they call the “securitization” of Mexico’s 
migration policy. By “securitization” they understand a policy imposed on Mexico by the United 
States that treats migrants as a security threat. This article challenges this interpretation, arguing 
that the theory of securitization is insufficient to understand the many factors that make possible the 
systematic violence of the human rights of migrants in transit in Mexico. KEYWORDS: international 
migration, human rights, securitization, civil society, migratory policy. 
 
In 2010 the corpses of 72 foreign citizens were discovered in San Fernando, Tamaulipas, in 
north-eastern Mexico. The massacre´s only survivor testified that they had been kidnapped 
by members of the local police who then handed them over to the criminal organization Los 
Zetas (an organization created and trained by former members of the Mexican military). They 
had been asked for money in exchange for their freedom, but they had none and so were shot 
in the back.2 From here on, the issue of international migration in Mexico has gradually won 
some recognition in the media. 
It would be hard to say that the San Fernando massacre took the different official 
bodies concerned with the issue by surprise. A year before, the country´s National 
Commission of Human Rights had presented to the public a report documenting how in six 
months more than 9,000 undocumented migrants transiting through to the United States had 
been kidnapped in Mexico.3 Since 2009, the shelters for migrants, journalists and human 
rights activists had also reported the grave abuses they suffer.4 For Jorge A. Bustamante, 
former UN Special Rapporteur on Migrants’ Rights, there is simply “no other country in the 
world where more deaths of international migrants happen” than in Mexico.5 So it is that 
some observers have described the situation of undocumented international migration in 
Mexico as “a holocaust,” “a humanitarian tragedy,” “a human rights crisis.”6 And yet, the 
irregular international migration in transit through Mexico is a problem largely ignored by 
academia. Its absence is especially striking in the international relations (IR) literature, 
despite its being an issue that directly concerns this discipline.7 The reports of activists and 
human rights organizations have covered the academic silence on the matter. 
How have activists and experts tried to explain the human rights crises of migrants 
transiting through Mexico? Reviewing a significant number of documents published on this 
issue in the last years by activists and human rights organizations it is plain that there is a 
certain consensus among the authors on the principal cause supposedly explaining the 
deplorable situation of undocumented international migration: the “securitization” of 
Mexico’s migration policy.8 According to them, the securitization of migration is a migratory 
policy imposed by the United States on Mexico after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 2001. This 
policy, the authors argue, is based on the belief that undocumented international migration is 
a national security threat, such that the Mexican state has deployed specific practices and 
laws to halt it. 
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Studies on the securitization of migration emerged over twenty years ago and have 
since influenced the discipline of IR.9 These studies have been useful in understanding the 
process through which countries like the United States have adopted more restrictive 
migratory policies and practices with the aim of checking migration. However, as these same 
studies have demonstrated, the process of the securitization of migration in those countries 
has not brought with it a human rights crisis.10 If Mexico is the country where more deaths 
of international migrants happen in the world, the explanation drawn from the theory of 
securitization would appear to be insufficient. If this is so, then what are the causes behind 
the deplorable situation of undocumented migrants in transit through the country? What are 
the factors generating the atrocities perpetrated against them? 
Responding to these questions entails a substantial inquiry, one beyond the reach of 
this article. Furthermore, before trying to give a new answer to these questions, it is 
appropriate to stop and analyze the existing explanation: that is, securitization. Hence this 
article seeks to respond to two questions. First, how is the reality of international migration 
in Mexico explained by those authors who approach it through the concept of securitization? 
Second, what evidence do they have to demonstrate what they say they explain? 
Hence the aim of this article is to explore the explanations framed by theories of 
securitization, their use in understanding what is happening with international migration in 
Mexico, and their validity based on the empirical evidence they offer to support what they 
affirm. To do this, this article is divided in four parts. First, I briefly describe the concept of 
securitization. Second, I critically analyze an important number of studies that, framed by 
securitization theories, attempt to explain the situation of international migration in Mexico. 
Third, I scrutinize the evidence used by the studies that talk of the securitization of migration 
in Mexico. There follows a section posing some of the weaknesses of these studies. The end 
offers a conclusion. 
 
 
Conceptual and methodological notes 
Some preliminary conceptual and methodological clarifications are in order. Throughout I 
shall use the categories of activists and experts interchangeably as it is readily found that in 
Mexico academic experts on the migration issue frequently collaborate with civil society 
activists and organizations or are fully one with them. The same happens in reverse: academic 
research is coordinated, edited and published by activists who collaborate in research centers 
and universities. In some cases, these activists and experts furthermore participate as state 
agents. In this sense, as Nicholas Guilhot affirms, these actors are “double agents,” serving 
equally in the fields of the state, academia and the organizations of civil society.11 
This inquiry draws on Michel Foucault’s genealogical methods.12 This is an 
interpretive frame that seeks to unsettle the stability of explanations considered fixed, that 
attempts to fragment apparently solid and unified interpretations, and that shows the 
heterogeneity and contingency of events and ideas apparently homogeneous and consistent.13 
Thus, unlike all the documents consulted here, this article does not take securitization as 
something obvious and evident. Thus too, far from repeating the commonplaces of activists 
and experts, this article seeks to demystify the powerful argument that talks of the 
securitization of migration in Mexico, appearing to easily explain what is happening with the 
undocumented foreign citizens. My aim is to challenge those experts and activists who 
devoutly repeat that everything that is happening in relation to migration is conditioned by 
securitization. This is no small matter. This article attempts nothing less than to dismantle 
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the interpretation that in the last ten years has dominated analysis on international migration 
in Mexico. 
 To select the texts I analyze here I followed the “method for composing our world” 
established by Bruno Latour in his study on the pasteurization of France.14 For Latour, this 
method “does not require us to decide in advance on a list of actors and possible actions. If 
we open the […] literature of the time”, he claims, “we find stories that define for us who are 
the main actors, what happens to them, what trials they undergo.” This method proved very 
useful for this article. It suffices to open any document by some expert or activist for this to 
guide the reader on those texts and actors who have the monopoly on the discourse, on the 
explanations, on what is happening with migration in transit through Mexico. To avoid any 
bias, as may be seen in the footnotes here, there is citation of a large number of documents 
published by diverse organizations and experts, among who are the most renowned Mexican 
migrantologists.  
 Finally, a note on this study´s time limit: the analysis is of texts published by activists 
and experts up until December 2012. The changes since then in migration management are 
not part of this article. 
 
The theory and practice of the securitization of international migration 
In 1995, Ole Waever coined the term securitization in reaction to traditional studies on 
security, to the realist and neo-realist theories of the discipline of IR that restricted the 
concept of “threats” only to dangers of a military type, generally between states.15 For 
Waever, and others like Barry Buzan, it was not sufficient to analyze an apparently objective 
threat. For these authors what mattered was the study of: (a) the process by which certain 
actors, such as the press or the executive, present before the public the existence of supposed 
threats (military or not) as a pretext for deploying certain emergency measures; and (b) the 
results of this process: for example, an increase in the number of police, greater resources, 
more armaments.16 In relation to the migration issue, these authors explored how in some 
countries international migration, with or without documents, went from being an issue of 
ordinary policy to a matter of security, one that demanded greater public attention and that 
legitimized urgent public policies.17 
 The importance of this theoretical focus is that it allowed an understanding of the 
securitization of international migration as a process in which multiple actors—government 
ministers, members of religions, journalists, academics, experts—intervene seeking to 
convince the public that migration is a latent threat to security. And, once migration comes 
to be seen as a danger by the public, these same actors can then justifiably design and dispose 
actions, laws, ad hoc rules, institutions, budgets and emergency mechanisms to end, avoid, 
halt, contain or control the danger—even if these dispositions violate the Constitution, 
international human rights norms, or if they go against common sense. 
 This interpretive frame of securitization won greater salience after the attacks of 9/11 
2001. What occurred that day served—and serves—as a pretext for some states (the United 
States, for instance) to harden their policies vis-à-vis international migration, represented as 
an imminent risk to public security and, above all, to national security. 
 It is important to emphasize that the events of 9/11 have only been an excuse for the 
change in the policies of some countries towards international migration. That is, the link 
between migration and national security was only made to 9/11 in some countries, not in 
others. In France, for instance, as Philippe Bourbeau has shown, 9/11 had a very limited 
impact. French migration policy is restrictive enough, but the terrorist attacks had very little 
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to do with this: that is, there were no significant changes in laws, state agents (as was the case 
with the French ministers) almost didn´t talk about the matter, and the leading newspapers 
seldom established the link between migration affairs and the attacks of 9/11.18 Put another 
way, the French state has traditionally had a restrictive migration policy, but this has been so 
since before the terrorist attacks in New York. 
 By contrast, an example like 9/11 has been manipulated to “securitize” migration 
policies in the United States. Adam Isacson and Maureen Meyer have shown that in the US, 
from 2001, there has been an explicit effort to link the migration issue with ideas of threats 
to national security. According to these authors, this is something that has been repeatedly 
affirmed in official speeches and documents like 2004´s National Border Patrol Strategy, or 
in the discussion in Congress in the context of 2002´s Homeland Security Act.19 By this logic, 
“any illegal entry could be a terrorist.”20 
 This rhetoric, so these authors point out, has had concrete consequences through the 
creation of new institutions and special norms, and through a constant increase in the budget 
and the number of agents deployed to control international immigration. Evidence of this, 
according to Isacson and Meyer, is the 2002 creation of the Department of Homeland 
Security which joins together distinct agencies connected with border security, and the 2005 
commencement of the Secure Border Initiative to reinforce the security of the border. 
Between 1992 and 2011, they observe, the number of agents of the Border Patrol at the south-
west border quintupled. And the total budget of the Border Patrol increased by 102% from 
2005.21 
 This is a very brief survey of the emergence of the theory of securitization, of its basic 
arguments and its use to explain, with greater or less success, what happens in practice in the 
sphere of international migration. I do not seek here to go any deeper into this theory. The 
point for now is to understand the source of the ideas and theoretical concepts that activists 
and experts collectively use when they try to explain what is happening in Mexico with 
international migration. Can it be said that the concept of securitization used to illustrate what 
happens in countries like the United States is of use in explaining “the humanitarian tragedy” 
of the migrants who cross through Mexico? How have those who affirm that the migration 
policy in Mexico is securitized demonstrated it? The following sections turn to these 
questions. 
 
 
The answer that explains everything: “securitization” 
To understand how activists, NGOs and some academics interpret what is happening with 
the migrants in Mexico, the departure point is to explore what their publications say. Upon 
reviewing a significant number of these texts, it is easy to find that the majority of them 
coincide in their diagnosis: the deplorable situation of the migrants in the country is the result 
of what they call “securitization.”22 Upon advancing in the analysis of these texts, it is evident 
that this concept has served to explain almost everything: the abandoning of a law (or the 
creating of another); the increase in the number of “operations” to carry out “migration 
checks,” but the reduction of migrants “detained” and “returned”; new dispositions on 
migration contrived by the federal government, along with their implementation (and 
manipulation) in the local sphere; the participation of organized crime in the field of 
migration; migration policies that occurred twenty, ten or three years since—and changes in 
the migration norms and practices that perhaps may come about in the future. 
5 
 
 But what is securitization? Based upon the texts consulted, the concept brings 
together three central ideas. First: that the Mexican state deals with undocumented migration 
as an issue strictly of national security and that it has deployed certain specific policies for 
this. Second: that this is a policy that commenced after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 2001 in 
the United States and that it was “imposed” on Mexico. Third: that it—and only it—explains 
the increase in the violations of the human rights of the migrants. 
The aforesaid may be illustrated by four examples. In the introduction that he wrote 
for a text published by an NGO, the scholar Manuel Ángel Castillo explains securitization in 
the following manner: “the incidents of September 2001 in United States territory led to” the 
promotion of “initiatives tending to confront … threats” to “national security”. This affected 
“the manner of confronting the migration dynamic,” not only in the United States but also in 
its “immediate area of influence”–that is, in Mexico.23 
In Seguridad para el migrante: una agenda por construir, the authors propose that 
“the policy of the United States fosters the perception that migrants are a threat to national 
security.” The “imposition” of this view of migration in countries like Mexico, they affirm, 
leads undocumented migrants to be a concern within “the agenda of the fight against 
terrorism.”24 And this, they conclude, is one of “the central causes on account of which a 
situation of humanitarian crisis is currently being lived in the migration issue.”25 
 The topic is tackled in a similar way in the book Migración y seguridad: nuevo desafío 
en México: “starting from the attacks of 11 September 2001, migration has occupied an ever 
more outstanding place in security policies, on the argument of preventing the entry of 
possible terrorists. This process of securitizing migration … has had influence in other 
countries, as is the case with Mexico.”26  
Finally, according to the document Situación de los derechos humanos de las 
personas migrantes y solicitantes de asilo detenidas en las estaciones migratorias de México, 
“the repressive model” of migration control has been promoted by the United States “strongly 
through the last years.” 27 Hence Mexico´s migration policy, the authors affirm, “has had as 
its fundamental engine the interest in guarding the security of the Mexican state from the—
unfounded—danger that foreign persons represent.”28 
 Thus far does the apparent consensus among experts and activists trying to explain 
the situation of transit migration in Mexico based upon securitization reach. The 
interpretation and use of this concept, however, changes from one text to another when the 
authors attempt to deepen their analyses. That is, upon thoroughly studying the arguments of 
the texts consulted on the securitization of migration in Mexico there appear a series of 
contradictions of which I underline three that are, in my opinion, fundamental. 
 
Securitization is and will always be 
The first transformation the concept undergoes has to do with its temporal origin. 
Securitization as a migration discourse and practice, so activists and experts say, arose 
starting from the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States (9/11). However, 
when they go deeper into the analysis of the situation of migrants in Mexico, these same 
activists talk of securitization as an atemporal phenomemon that explains the migration 
policies in the 1990s (a decade before 2001) or those migration practices deployed since 2011 
(a decade after). 
 For instance, securitization supposedly serves to easily explain what has happened in 
Mexico “during the last two decades” (that is, from the 1990s)29; “in the current era and 
especially since September 2001.”30 Others, following the idea that securitization started 
6 
 
after the terrorist attacks of September 2001, indicate a crucial example of it in “Plan Sur,” 
implemented by the Mexican government in 2001 with “a police and inquisitorial focus,” 
and that “oriented migration policy to augment the capacity to guard against, control, inspect 
and contain the migratory flows.”31 The problem is that Plan Sur, as other experts observe, 
began in July 2001, that is, some two months before the attacks of 11 September.32 
 For others, securitization can explain any migration law or practice that has taken 
place in Mexico in the last ten years: in 2002, through the forming of the High Level Group 
on Border Security33; in 2007, through the mention of the migration issue in the National 
Development Plan´s section concerning national security34; in 2010, through the “formal” 
delegation of the capacity to carry out migration operations to the regional agents of the 
National Migration Institute; or in 2011, through the coming into force of the Migration Law 
which mentions the topic of national security. 
 
Securitization is the origin of everything 
The second transformation the concept of securitization undergoes on being used by experts 
and activists to explain the Mexican case is that of its supposed effects in migration policy 
and practice. Originally, the idea of securitization assumes a discourse based on the definition 
of migrants as a prominent threat to national security. This implies the deployment of 
migration norms, laws, rules, institutions, authorities and practices to control this potential 
danger to security. In Mexico, securitization serves for the experts to interpret–today–norms, 
laws and practices that currently limit the trans-migrants´ human rights, even though the said 
dispositions have existed in the country at least since 1974, or even since 1930. For some 
authors, it is only owing to securitization that we can understand “the applicability of norms 
and practices of migration control and inspection that restrict the human rights of migrants.”35 
And yet, how to explain that exactly the same dispositions functioned in the country since 
before 11 September 2001? For instance, the power of the authorities to detain migrants 
unable to prove their legal stay in the country or to establish prison-like detention centers 
where migrants are deprived of their freedom.36 
Securitization has been useful to talk of the deployment of practices that even run 
counter to each other. For example, it serves to approach, at the same time, the consequences 
of the excess and absence of border control–depending on which expert considers there to be 
excess or absence of border control. The authors who believe that the government has been 
inefficient in border control think this has forced the authorities to increase the number of 
raids and “migration filters” within the country, outside of international entry points. And 
“where there are greater [migration] controls, greater are the risks facing persons all along 
the migration circuit, because migrants have to fall back on the trafficking networks that are 
today controlled by organized crime networks.”37 By contrast, those who think that there has 
been greater border control consider that this has “involved negligence in the effective control 
of the transit routes.”38 And this negligence in the transit routes, in turn, has brought greater 
abuses against the migrants, as there are no authorities to protect them from organized 
crime.39 How can securitization serve to support opposing explanations? 
 
Securitization was imposed by the United States, although really it doesn´t matter 
The final distortion of the concept has to do with its origin. The consensus among experts 
and activists is that securitization was imposed on Mexico by the United States after 11 
September 2001. This is an explanation that is believable but difficult to demonstrate.  “I do 
not know for a fact if there were pressures or open demands from the United States to exercise 
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a greater control by the Mexican authorities in the southern border,” affirms Natalia Armijo.40 
The same is also admitted by Manuel Ángel Castillo and Mónica Toussaint: “it is difficult to 
prove the influence of the United States policy of national security in the rise of the 
mechanisms of migration control in the southern border of Mexico.”41 For these authors, the 
really important thing is that “starting from September 2001 there were significant changes 
that had implications for [the migration] policies and measures.” In equal fashion for Adam 
Isacson “Mexico has increased its securitization efforts along its border with the United 
States.” However, Isacson observes, “clearly” those securitization efforts have been carried 
out by Mexico “whether encouraged by the United States or not.”42 Thus, the irony is that 
the authors who affirm that securitization is something “imposed” on Mexico from the United 
States are exactly the same who then warn that this cannot be demonstrated, or really doesn´t 
matter. 
 In sum, upon reviewing a significant number of texts that talk about the situation of 
international migration in Mexico it is plain that “securitization” is a concept fully evoked 
and shared by activists and experts. With variations and nuances, the majority of the texts 
coincide on three basic components: that the Mexican state strictly considers international 
migration a problem of national security and that it acts in consequence through public norms 
and policies; that it is a view imposed from the Unites States that began immediately after 
the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001; and that this explains “the humanitarian tragedy” 
of the migrants in transit through Mexico. None the less, in using this concept in their 
analyses, the authors as a matter of fact end up passing over these three factors. These texts 
produce the sensation that securitization has turned into less an explanation than “a dogma 
of faith”--an idea that frequently shows up in the rhetoric of the activists, that is easily 
believable, that appears to explain with certain simplicity what is happening (and what is not) 
with undocumented migration in Mexico, but that almost nobody really knows what is. 
 
 
Migration control in Mexico: the available evidence 
To be able to talk about securitization in Mexico, the evidence presented by activists and 
experts ought to permit us to find three elements in the discourse and practice of the 
government. First: the notion that migration represents an existential threat to the security of 
the state and society. Second: the pre-eminence given in speeches and laws to migration as a 
threat to security. Third: the political and institutional effects of these ideas, which ought to 
have brought substantive changes in praxis: for instance, greater budgets, more immigration 
agents.43 To know if these elements are present in the Mexican case, I shall take the examples 
and evidence that the same activists and experts normally use when they argue that migration 
in Mexico has been securitized. 
 
Securitization in official discourse? 
In Mexico, activists and experts affirm that migration is securitized. However, they do not 
offer examples of how this occurs in government rhetoric. In the texts consulted for this 
article it was not possible to find examples of speeches or at least key phrases pronounced 
during the terms of Presidents Felipe Calderón (2006-2012), Vicente Fox (2000-2006) or 
Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000) that explicitly linked transit migration with security, or that 
represented migrants as threat to Mexico’s security. 
 This allows it to be inferred that the supposed securitization of international migration 
in Mexico is not present, at least, in official discourse. Neither the Presidents nor their 
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Secretaries of State, for example, are talking about migrants in transit as a danger for the 
country´s security. At least not until before 2012. 
 
Securitization in legal dispositions? 
An example frequently cited by the NGOs that seek to demonstrate that migration has been 
securitized in Mexican norms and laws is the National Development Plan, the Plan Nacional 
de Desarrollo (PND) of 2007-2012. This is due to its having “fused migration and national 
security,” as the activists affirm.44 
 In effect, the PND´s section on “national security” mentions the migration theme: “a 
fundamental condition in the policy of national security consists in guaranteeing the order 
and legality of the migratory and commercial flows, or flows of any type, in the more than 
4,300 kilometers that comprise our borders.”45 This is the only time that the theme of 
migration is explicitly linked to national security. But this is what any state seeks to attain, 
as a matter of principle. Like any other sovereign country, Mexico has tried to control 
migratory and commercial flows and its borders since its independence, and it is not for this 
that anyone talked about securitization or policies imposed by the United States immediately 
after 9/11.  
The PND´s section on national security also talks of border control and again 
mentions migrants. However, in doing so it does not refer to them as a threat, nor does it 
represent them as undesirable or dangerous actors. To the contrary, it talks of “safeguarding 
security on the borders, along with the integrity and respect for the human rights both of the 
inhabitants of these zones and of migrants.”46 It affirms that “the strategies of border security 
should focus on the protection of migrants,” for being exposed to “groups of smugglers and 
traffickers in people and drugs.” 
 But there is another section of the PND that mentioned the migration theme: Effective 
Democracy and Responsible Foreign Policy.47 There it was affirmed that the government 
was seeking “the protection of Latin American citizens who enter the country, often in an 
undocumented manner and in deplorable security conditions.”48 It even proposed “building 
a new culture of migration” that would promote “the co-responsibility between the countries 
that share with Mexico migration flows to foster economic growth and social development 
in the most underdeveloped zones, and guarantee at the same time the protection of the rights 
of the migrants …”49 Is this securitization? 
Neither the Mexican Constitution nor the Law of National Security present a link 
between migration and security. So it is from a very secondary norm that the texts here 
consulted cite another example to try to demonstrate the securitization of migration—the 
Accord recognizing the National Institute of Migration, the Instituto Nacional de Migración 
(INM) as a national security agency.50 Yet, while this is a frequently evoked example the 
authors who analyze the reasons why this disposition contributes to securitization are rare. 
 The main question that ought to be posed is how the formal identification of the INM 
as one of the multiple national security agencies was justified. The presidential decree giving 
rise to this disposition maintains that the laws in the framework for the INM have always 
been related with the country´s security.51 The INM can, for example, restrict the emigration 
of Mexicans when “national interest so demands”; guard the entry and departure of Mexicans 
(and foreigners), and check their documentation. Are these functions imposed by the Unites 
States on the Mexican government after 9/11? Were they designed with the objective of 
controlling the Central American migrants who are represented as a threat to security? In 
reality, these are dispositions that the INM has since its creation; functions that in distinct 
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forms have always been in Mexican legislation.52 Besides, these measures equally affect 
Mexicans and non-Mexicans. 
A last example is the Ley de Migración of 2011. In effect, this law mentions in its 
first article that it seeks “the preservation of national sovereignty and security,” although it 
never establishes how it is going to contribute to this or what is understood by security. 
Furthermore, the law affirms that it seeks “the respect for, protection and safeguarding of the 
human rights” of migrants.53  In any case, the relation between security and migration in this 
law is not something new. As José A. Guevara correctly points out, this link has been present 
in the legal statutes in Mexico from the beginning of the 19th century. Thus, the 2011 law 
merely consolidates the views of migration and security that already existed in previous 
pieces of legislation: for example, in the Law on the faculties of the Government relative to 
the expulsion of non-naturalized foreigners of 1832, in the Law on aliens and naturalization 
of 1886, in the Law of Immigration of 1909, in the Law of Migration of 1930, or in the 
General Law of Population of 1974.54 
 The meticulous review by Guevara of Mexican migration norms thus reveals that the 
problem is not securitization, that the link between security and migration has always existed 
in Mexico, and that therefore it has not been imposed by the United States. Guevara´s study 
demonstrates that the problem--perhaps more disturbing--is xenophobia and racism, the 
pillars that have historically framed the link between international migration and security in 
the country.55 
 
Securitization in practice? 
For some activists, the administrative detention of migrants unable to prove their legal stay 
in Mexico demonstrates that migration is securitized.56 The Migration Law of 2011 
contemplates, for example, “presentation”--the peculiar term employed in the law to indicate 
that a migrant can be detained for no more than 36 hours. It also establishes “lodging”57—
the euphemism used to refer to the detention of migrants from between 15 and 60 days in 
“migration stations,” which in their turn are the name given for the prison-like centers where 
migrants find themselves detained.58 
 However, these dispositions did not start in 2001 after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, 
nor have they been justified before the public with the argument that migrants are a threat to 
national security. These measures have existed since at least 1974, for so the General Law of 
Population established them. This law empowered the Ministry of the Interior to establish 
“migration stations” in places considered appropriate “to lodge” migrants.59 The said law did 
indeed criminalize the foreigners who settled without documents in the country, providing 
for this case a sentence of up to two years in prison.60 
 For other activists a second proof of securitization in practice is related to the 
mechanisms by which certain authorities besiege migrants within the country, in places 
distinct from the internment points.61 For this, The Migration Law of 2011 uses three terms: 
“control,” “verification” and “migration revision.”62 
 Despite the questionable–and perhaps unconstitutional–nature these measures may 
have, they were not designed as a response to the attacks of 9/11. The harassment of migrants 
has been authorized by law for at least three decades. For example, the General Law of 
Population of 1974 granted discretionary powers to the Ministry of the Interior to promote 
before other federal or local authorities measures “to subject the immigration of foreigners 
to the forms it judges appropriate, and to procure the best assimilation of these to the national 
setting and their adequate arrangement in the territory.”63 Since 1999, the law empowered 
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the authorities to undertake “verification visits outside the established fixed revision points,” 
and “migration revision on routes or provisional points distinct from those established.”64 
These measures, moreover, affect both foreigners with documents and Mexicans. 
Furthermore, these migration “controls” would appear to be rather inefficient, according to 
official data. The number of Central American migrants detained and expelled by Mexico 
gradually diminished between 2005 and 2010. In 2005, Mexico detained and expelled 
223,000 Central American trans-migrants, while less than 64,000 in 2010.65 
 Thus, one of the arguments of the civil society organizations to prove that in Mexico 
migration is securitized in practice refers to the INM´s capacity to undertake “operations” 
with the end of detaining undocumented migrants. However, despite the deployment of 
“operations” there were less migrants “retained” and “returned.” Between 2005 and 2010, 
there was a decrease of 72% in the number of Central American migrants detained and 
expelled by Mexico. In contrast, in the United States, in exactly the same period, there was 
an increase of 89% in the number of Central American migrants returned to their countries.66 
That is, in the United States the figures match with the policy of securitization: there is a 
discourse that represents migrants as a threat, more restrictive rules and practices, more 
people detained and deported every year. In Mexico exactly the contrary occurs: there is not 
an official discourse on securitization; the “operations” that supposedly demonstrate 
securitization in practice have existed for decades; and there were less people detained and 
expelled between 2005 and 2010 according to the available official information. 
 A third argument to demonstrate that in Mexico migration policy “has securitization 
as its cornerstone” is related to the participation of security agents distinct from the personnel 
of the INM in the migration “control”: for example, the Federal Police.67 However, this 
questionable disposition has existed in the country since 1930. The Migration Law of that 
year authorized the migration authorities to solicit the aid of the public forces, federal or 
local, to carry out their tasks.68 Something similar was ordered by the General Law of 
Population of 1999: “the Ministry of the Interior, through the personnel of the migration 
services and the Preventive Federal Police, shall be able to carry out … verification visits” 
and “migration revision on routes or provisional points distinct from those established.”69 
 Finally, the evolution of the INM´s budget does not follow a coherent pattern. What 
can be known is that it has not substantially increased. Between 2005 and 2011, it could be 
said that the resources approved for the INM in the federal budget of expenditure did not go 
up in a significant way because they did not go up on average more than 20% in all those 
years.70 In 2008, seven years after 9/11, the budget suddenly increased 90%. However, in 
2009 the resources went down 14%. Can the budget cut also be explained by securitization? 
Since then and until 2012, it remained constant. 
 
The insufficiencies of the discourse of securitization 
Despite the lack empirical evidence, the idea that Mexico’s migration policy is securitized 
has become a commonplace among many of the activists connected with the migration issue. 
We could believe that the explanation of securitization, like a dogma of faith, is a truth that 
does not admit doubts and that, therefore, does not require evidence to be believed. The 
problem is that the way experts and activists have adapted the concept of securitization in 
Mexico presents some problems. 
 
Immutable and pure 
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The first weakness of the texts that explain the situation of international migration in Mexico 
through the theory of securitization is that they assume that the migration policy is 
immutable: that is, that it does not change with the passing of times. This allows the activists 
to explain events that happened in 2011, 2001 or 1990; and to predict situations that may 
occur in the future. As if the migration policy and its management were identical in the 
governments of Presidents Salinas and Calderón. As if the civil society organizations that 
promote and defend the human rights of migrants were today equal to those of the 1980s. 
 Immutability brings with it another weakness: the fantasy of purity. That is, the texts 
here consulted talk of securitization as something that is foreign to its historical, social, 
political or economic context. Securitization as a state policy passes across the years without 
seeing itself affected by economic squeezes, political instability, crises of violence, migratory 
flows or the work of civil society organizations or transnational lobbying networks. It walks 
on without getting dirty. Securitization would appear not to vary in intensity. Is there some 
change in the level of securitization of migration practice between the Law of Population of 
1974 and the Law of 2011? 
 
Beyond the state 
One of the most serious insufficiencies of the securitization discourse of the activists and 
experts is that it ignores a multiplicity of elements that make possible the suffering and abuses 
that foreign citizens without documents in transit through the country systematically endure. 
The discourse of securitization concentrates on the performance of the state and its agents, 
along with the effects of restrictive laws that these design and implement. It implicitly 
assumes that upon the disappearance of securitization in the migration policy that has been 
imposed by the United States the situation of the undocumented foreigners in Mexico will 
improve. However, this overlooks that “the humanitarian tragedy” of the migrants in transit 
is also the result of other factors, some structural, others conjunctional, that have nothing to 
do with the supposed securitization nor with the state: for example, xenophobia and racism71; 
the fact that the kidnapping of transmigrants and what comes with it – extortion, torture, 
murder, disappearance – is a lucrative business for broad sectors of the population in 
Mexico72; the fact that criminal organizations are exploring new illegal markets (mass 
kidnappings). 
 
Conclusion 
A significant number of activists and experts found in securitization an argument apparently 
explaining with ease everything that happens to the migrants in transit in Mexico. And yet, 
all define what securitization is in a different and at times contradictory way; and almost 
always without proofs. What are we talking about when we talk about the securitization of 
international migration in Mexico? 
The securitization that affects the migration policy and management in other countries 
has entailed three things: the public and extensive notion that undocumented migrants are a 
risk to security; the pre-eminence given in speeches and legal dispositions to migration as a 
threat; the materializing of policies and institutions designed to detain the danger that 
migrants represent. The adoption and adaptation of the theory of securitization on the part of 
many activists and experts who seek to explain what is happening in Mexico has involved 
three assumptions: that the government treats migration as an issue exclusively of security 
and that on account of this it has implemented restrictive policies; that this policy commenced 
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after the attacks of 2001 in the United States and was “imposed” on Mexico; that it alone 
explains the rise in the abuses against migrants. 
 However, these same authors have not provided convincing evidence to demonstrate 
that this occurs. There are no traces of an official discourse that explicitly portrays migrants 
as a potential threat to national security. By contrast with what happens in countries like the 
United States, in Mexico government rhetoric talks, ironically, of “protecting” migrants and 
of “respecting” their human rights. Not all dispositions that currently serve to control 
international migration–“revisions,” “lodgings,” “operations”– are necessarily more 
restrictive than in the past. Moreover, the majority of the dispositions have existed for 
decades; that is, they do not appear to have been “imposed” recently by the United States 
after the attacks of 9/11. 
 Beyond the absence of evidence, the argument of securitization is founded on 
assumptions that are not totally correct. For example, it assumes that migration dispositions, 
policies and management in Mexico are immutable, detached from their political, historical 
or social context. To claim that everything that happens with undocumented migrants can be 
understood with securitization obscures another type of more ranging explanations: the 
multiplication of criminal groups, the indifference of Mexican society to the drama of Central 
American migration, the fact that undocumented migration means great business for wide 
sectors of the population, the limited capacity of the language of human rights to represent 
the suffering that is not only caused by the state but also by ordinary Mexicans. 
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